As Deputy Master Marzec put it at the start of her judgment in Appiah & Anor v Leeds City Council & Anor [2025] EWHC 1537 (KB):
1. This claim concerns the detention of the First Claimant (“C1”), under the Mental Health Act 1983 (“the MHA 1983”). She was detained between 26 April 2019 and 23 August 2019, a period of about 4 months, during which time she was given treatment in the form of depot injections of anti-psychotic medications without her consent and against her will. She alleges that such detention and treatment was unlawful and constituted false imprisonment and various breaches of her rights under the European Convention of Human Rights. The Second Claimant (“C2”), C1’s husband, claims an infringement of his right to family life under Article 8 of the ECHR resulting from his having been deprived of his wife’s company for the period during which she was unlawfully detention. The Claimants are, and at all relevant times have been, litigants in person.
2. This claim is currently only against the Second Defendant (“D2”) the Health Trust responsible for C1’s detention. D2 was also the employer of the two consultant psychiatrists who made the recommendations for her detention under s.3 of MHA 1983. The claim against D1, Leeds City Council, was struck out by order of Mrs Justice Yip DBE dated 15 July 2022 on the basis that Cs should not have leave pursuant to s.139 to bring proceedings against D1 because Cs did not have an arguable claim that D1 had acted “in bad faith or without reasonable care” pursuant to s.139 MHA 1983 – see [2022] EWHC 2546 (KB) (“the Yip judgment”).
There is a very complicated procedural history to the case, and the applications before the court concerned whether the claim should be struck out, or summary judgment granted in favour of the second defendant.
At the heart of Deputy Master Marzec’s decision not to accede to these applications, and to allow the matter to proceed to trial, were the following passages:
63. It seems to me that it is at least possible that C1 could succeed in all or part of her claim, even without proving that one or more of the clinicians was negligent. If D2 had not properly followed the statutory procedures under the MHA 1983 before or during her detention, C1’s detention would be unlawful even if the clinicians had done their tasks with reasonable care. If C1 was held in detention for an overlong period, her detention might have become unlawful despite being initially lawful. If the drug treatment was administered in a disproportionately aggressive way, her claim under Article 3 might have merit. These are matters that need to be explored at trial. I cannot securely determine at this stage, and without having been addressed on the relevant principles of law governing each cause of action, that Cs cannot succeed on any part of their claims without expert psychiatric evidence.
64. Moreover, the difficulty as I see it for D2 is that it asks this Court to strike out or give summary judgment on Cs’ entire claims without having served any evidence itself. I should assume on this application that Cs are right when they assert in their evidence that, as a matter of fact, C1 was not suffering from any mental illness. I note that D2 has chosen not to serve any evidence on this issue, or any other, whether in support of its application or for trial. Currently there is therefore no evidence to contradict Cs’ case on that issue, or challenging C1’s evidence that medication was forced on her in a degrading and “inhuman” manner”, or any other aspect of Cs’ case.
65. I do not know why D2 has decided not to serve any witness evidence, except for the fact that Dr King is apparently currently unavailable. Other clinicians and relevant individuals might be available to give evidence.
66. As to the absence of any expert evidence from D2, during the hearing Ms Goold explained that D2 had served expert evidence on Cs that was password protected, but the password had not been provided pending Cs serving their own expert evidence. I asked Ms Goold if D2 would be prepared to disclose that evidence now, in order to assist the Court in forming a view on the merits. I was told that D2 was not prepared to do so because it would be unfair to D2, Cs having not served any expert evidence. Since Cs have indicated that they do not intend to rely on expert evidence, it seems to me that D2 should have served it own evidence. Be that as it may, D2 has chosen to make and pursue its application for summary judgment without any evidence supporting its application other than a witness statement from its solicitor, who has no first-hand knowledge of the facts of the claim or any medical expertise.
67. In these circumstances, where an individual who was, on her case, not sick but was nevertheless detained against her will, and no factual evidence has been served by the Trust as to the procedures followed or the circumstances of C1’s detention and continued detention or any other aspect of her complaint, and no expert evidence on any matter, I am not prepared to say that Cs have no real prospect of success.
68. Further, if I am wrong as to Cs’s prospects of success, in my judgment there is to be a good, indeed a compelling, reason for this case to go to trial. When a decision is made to deprive someone of their liberty and forcibly inject them with medication against their will, at the very least the responsible authority should explain and justify its decisions. It is not satisfactory that Dr King, whose decision it was to remove C1 to psychiatric ward and thereafter to instigate the s.3 process, is apparently currently unwilling to make a witness statement as to his actions and that D2 has not offered any other evidence either from Dr Cobb or the unnamed consultant psychiatrist who supported Dr King’s and Dr Cobb’s recommendations to detain, or anyone else.
These do not mean that the claimants will succeed at trial, but they serve (especially the last paragraph) as an important reminder of the importance both of the procedural protections contained in the MHA 1983 against arbitrary detention, and of the State being able to show that those protections have been complied with. They therefore serve as an interesting domestic counterpoint to the recent Strasbourg case of Spivak v Ukraine [2025] ECHR 136, in which the same issues were emphasised at an ECHR level.
