Nottingham City Council v CD [2026] EWCOP 60 (T2) is a case which adds to the (small) stock of reported cases on hoarding, represents a careful exercise in judicial self-limitation, and a reminder of the importance of the Care Act 2014.
The case concerned a 65 year old woman, identified as CD, who was described thus:
3. CD has been diagnosed with a very severe hoarding disorder as well as a mixed anxiety and depressive disorder. These issues are long standing. In other respects, CD is an apparently intelligent, articulate and capable woman. Her difficulties manifest themselves in times of crisis and severe stress and she becomes acutely compromised in terms of rational decision making. As is not uncommon, she can be very mistrustful of authority figures and, unfortunately, is prone to disengage or actively reject help from those trying to assist her or steer her towards supportive services.
Proceedings began in April 2024 when the local authority responsible for her welfare applied for a declaration that CD “that CD lacks capacity in relation to her hoard/belongings and care and support. And order authorising the conveyance of CD to a care home and authorisation for a deep clean and clearance of the hoard to be undertaken.” This application was made in the context of live possession proceedings in respect of CD’s (rented) flat. As HHJ Rogers noted:
7. […] The urgent objectives were to get the hoard cleared and the flat cleaned. This Court has no jurisdiction in respect of the housing issue and no Judge in this Court would seek to interfere with the independent adjudication of the District Judge in the County Court in respect of the factual analysis or discretionary decisions there to be made. However, it is perfectly legitimate for this Court to make best interest decisions for a person lacking capacity within a relevant area of decision making.
8. Put simply, as CD is at risk of losing her home and if she is adjudged as lacking capacity to deal with the hoarding issue, then it is legitimate and, if in her best interests, desirable to take steps on her behalf to facilitate the clearing of the hoard in order that her position in the County Court is objectively likely to be the most favourable. If it is also necessary, in order to give effect to that objective, to take ancillary steps, such as removing her temporarily from the home and accommodating her in a care home, even if that is against her will, then so long as it is in her best interests overall, such ancillary steps may be sanctioned.
HHJ Rogers identified, however, that it was
9. […] necessary briefly to review how events played out in reality. Section B of the bundle simply comprises the applications and orders made. It runs to a staggering 143 pages. A great many orders have been made. Some are purely procedural, but many were designed to drive the case forward. Progress has been woefully slow. Nothing I say is intended as a criticism of CD as it is clear that her personality and psychological make up tend to militate against her own best interests, but it is necessary to record the fact that virtually at every turn CD has impeded progress. She refused to co-operate with or even meet the expert appointed to provide an assessment. She failed to co-operate with her own solicitors, criticising them and making various unilateral applications or informal requests to the Court without their knowledge. So problematic was her conduct that Her Honour Judge Gillespie made an order designed to mitigate her behaviour in this regard. (B143) She did not attend the hearing at which I made the substantive order for clearance (B122). However, she was represented by counsel who, upon instructions from the Official Solicitor, did not oppose the making of the order including the consequential directions. Nevertheless, shortly afterwards, she made her own free-standing application to stay the order, generating some confusion and delay.
Finally, however, declarations were made that CD lacked capacity to litigate, to make decisions about clearing her property, including the management of her belongings and to make decisions about care and residence while displaced from her home during the clearance. A best interests order was then made, sanctioning CD’s removal temporarily to a care home in order that the very substantial hoard of goods could be cleared from her flat, which was “an order which CD herself strongly opposed, although the Official Solicitor, on her behalf, accepted the objective desirability of it” (paragraph 11). Then:
12. For essentially logistical reasons to do with the clearance company, the practical detail of the clearance itself took longer than expected and was not quite as anticipated. Happily, though, it was successful in that a great deal of waste material was removed and objects which were to be retained were sorted out and stored. Although CD is profoundly unhappy with the result, I have no hesitation in expressing my objective view that the process has overwhelmingly been accomplished in her best interests. CD was required temporarily to leave the premises in accordance with the order but has been able to return to resume occupation.
13. It is the experience of those dealing with such cases as this and is hardly surprising that the clearance of a hoard is only the first stage. Vulnerable individuals with hoarding or compulsive tendencies are liable to begin the process of hoarding again if care is not taken with practical steps to avoid that situation. Support is also often a desirable resource if the person concerned is willing and able to accept such support.
The dispute before HHJ Rogers now was as to what – if anything – the remaining live issue before the court was. The Official Solicitor characterised the wider question as “the related question of how AB is to be supported thereafter, to maintain her property and avoid eviction, is of equal importance (paragraph 14). The local authority “accept[ed] that the post clearance phase is relevant and that the local authority, and indeed the Court, are rightly engaged with and interested in the support which realistically can be offered to CD, but he resists the implication of Ms Rickard’s submission that the Court has an ongoing and expanded role in this regard. This dispute goes to the heart of the issue before me.” To that end, the Official Solicitor was seeking permission to instruct an expert to report on capacity in an expanded range of areas and on best interests.
HHJ Rogers observed that:
35. The jurisdiction of the Court is always available, in the sense that repeated applications, if appropriate, may be made. However, in my judgment, that is to be regarded quite differently from the proposition that the Court is an ever-present safety net or a constant supervisor or scrutineer of a public body discharging its statutory responsibilities. To draw an analogy from another now rarely used jurisdiction, P, in the Court of Protection, is not to be likened to a Ward in the Family Division, certainly as Wardship was exercised historically often lasting throughout a child’s minority. In my judgment, the role of the Court of Protection is to adjudicate as expeditiously as possible upon the question or decision before it and then to withdraw. To adopt the often-heard cliché, it is not the role of the Court to be a micro manager.
36. In this case Mr Johnson urges the Court to bring the proceedings to an end. Earlier in this judgment I highlighted the exact wording of the Application and the scope of the capacity declarations made by Judge Reece. The phrase “care and support” in the Application is potentially broad and is slightly vague, but I have no doubt that in context it is referable to the issue then under consideration, namely the urgent problem of CD’s overcrowded accommodation with the implications for the parallel possession proceedings. It is not, in my judgment, sensible or right to read that phrase as encompassing CD’s wider general circumstances and functioning so that the Court is required to embark upon a wide-ranging review of capacity in many domains, whether or not identifiable best interest decisions are to be made.
37. This not a narrow “pleading point” and it would be unhelpful to resolve the dispute on that basis. Although Ms Rickard says in her position statement that if the point is taken it can be cured by an appropriate oral application to expand the scope of the proceedings, that again tends to reduce the point to one of technicality. The real point which is one of substance is whether in practical terms this Court has done all it needs to do at this point in time. As I have already noted, the Court is concerned with the post clearance phase but, in my judgment, to anticipate an enduring, almost open-ended role for the Court is not only unrealistic and disproportionate but is also contrary to principle.
38. His Honour Judge Reece found that CD lacked capacity to make decisions about clearing her property and in respect of care and residence during her displacement. He was not asked to go further and did not. That, in my judgment, is significant. Everyone agrees that it is an essential gloss to read into the concept of “clearance” the post clearance phase to ensure the problem does not immediately occur. However, capacity decisions are not made for their own sake or in a vacuum but are the essential tools to facilitate best interest decisions.
39. It is important therefore, in my judgment, to identify with precision what best interest issues are actually in play in this case. As is made clear in A Local Authority v JB [2021] UKSC 35 it is always essential to identify “the matter” under consideration and to formulate the relevant information relevant to the decision. Obviously the two central questions were, should the hoard be cleared and, if necessary to facilitate that, should steps be permitted to remove CD from the flat? Beyond those, it becomes more difficult, in my judgment. It is reasonable to formulate the further issue as, is it in CD’s best interests to be provided with support, services and advice (if she is prepared to engage) to help her manage the situation post clearance, in particular in so far as that impacts upon her ability to maintain her tenancy?
40. With respect to Ms Rickard’s forceful argument to the contrary, I am not persuaded that there is a much wider question to be addressed as to her care needs generally or effectively an open-ended point about avoiding eviction. I do not wish to mischaracterise Ms Rickard’s careful argument or be unfair to her. At no stage did she submit in terms that this Court has an open-ended and unlimited supervisory role. To have done so would have been unworthy of her experience and expertise. I do, however, confess to some anxiety as to the implications of her broad submission that there needs to be a much more wide ranging enquiry into CD’s ability to manage her tenancy over a protracted period of uncertain length. In my judgment, such an investigation begins to take on the character of a holistic evaluation of CD’s situation rather than a focussed response to specific capacity and best interests live questions.
41. Of course, the Court can make appropriate best interests decisions about aspects of care and frequently does in a suitable case. Here however, no particular question for resolution has been raised. Normally the Court will have a binary choice or a series of available options to consider in respect of a particular identified issue. It is not for the Court to investigate all or many aspects of an individual’s life or to write a blueprint for living. In paragraph 10 of her position statement Ms Rickard argues for a further capacity assessment on the issue of care needs including maintaining the tenancy. No other area of functioning is identified. That is not, in my judgment, a sufficient identification of a live issue to justify expanding and continuing the proceedings.
42. The tenancy is, of course, a pressing issue. The hoard has been cleared and the role of this Court in that regard is entirely legitimate. However, the outstanding concerns of the landlord are not matters upon which this Court can helpfully intervene, nor should it. The provision of information can be facilitated but the questions of possession or the execution of the warrant must, in my judgment, be left to the County Court.
Much of the dispute turned, in reality, on whether the support plan put forward by the local authority were adequate. However, HHJ Rogers observed that:
44. The reality is that there is no completely satisfactory plan for the reasons given by BW [CD’s allocated social worker]. A highly interventionist regime might well ensure a hoard does not recur and might go some way to appease the landlord. Such a regime is, however, highly likely to heighten CD’s stress levels leading to conflict or sustained disengagement. A less interventionist approach carries risks, as BW acknowledges, but is likely to be a better option in which cooperation is achieved. BW’s analysis of the situation is, in my judgment, considered and thoughtful and the underlying factual situation upon which he bases his conclusions is unchallenged. Having looked at the whole of the evidence, I have arrived at the same conclusion and so it is proper that I endorse the local authority’s plan.
45. In my judgment, the option preferred by the local authority is in CD’s best interests. It is the least interventionist and is likely to be the option most likely to receive CD’s support. A reduction in her anxiety is not only a desirable thing in itself but offers her the chance to exercise autonomy in a calm and measured way, to some extent
46. Were I to accede to Ms Rickard’s request to adjourn, I am not satisfied much would change. I am sure that an external expert assessment would be a useful further view but nothing which might there be said would, in my judgment, be likely to change the acute difficulty of CD’s engagement and her tendency, unintentionally, to act in a way which is contrary to her own best interests.
In relation to the potential for further evidence on capacity, HHJ Rogers considered that, on facts, there was no need for such evidence to determine any issue properly before the court. Importantly, HHJ Rogers rejected a submission that BW was unsuitable as a capacity assessor as he was not a specialist in hoarding nor a formally instructed independent expert. His reasons for rejecting this submission are worth setting out in full in light of some misunderstandings around the Court of Appeal decision to which reference was made:
50. In my judgment, in the context of Court of Protection proceedings that submission is difficult to get off the ground. It is trite that in this jurisdiction capacity assessments take a range of forms and are made by a range of individuals. Poole J in AMDC v AG & CI [2020] EWCOP 58 noted that formally admitted expert evidence is by no means the only way capacity assessments are provided to the Court. However, Ms Rickard relied heavily in her oral reply upon the recent important authority of R (on the application of TDB) v London Borough of Haringey & Mind [2026] EWCA Civ 1184 (hereafter TDB). As the title betrays this is an appeal in a judicial review in the Administrative Court. It is not a Court of Protection case although the facts reveal an overlap. She submits, based upon TDB, that in this case the complexities of CD’s situation mean that only a capacity assessment undertaken by an independent expert will be sufficient.
51. The issue in TDB as identified by Baker LJ at the commencement of his judgment, with which the other members of the Court agreed, was:
“whether the local authority was required to carry out an assessment of the appellant’s capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 prior to completing the Care Act 2014 assessment.” (hereafter the Care Act)
Amongst the specific grounds of appeal was that an insufficiently expert assessor had been used in what was regarded as a case of exceptional complexity.
52. Baker LJ sets out extensively the provisions of the two statutes and discusses at length their interplay and ultimately the need for a suitable assessment, applying the provisions of the 2005 Act, whenever a Care Act assessment is required when the question of capacity is at large. Axiomatically, this is a decision about the role of local authorities carrying out their statutory responsibilities under the Care Act and is not a decision about the practise in the Court of Protection. I am not persuaded that Baker LJ intended by his words in TDB to seek to change the established case management approaches to expert evidence in the Court of Protection.
53. Ms Rickard essentially relies upon the specific decision in respect of the discrete ground of appeal concerning the suitability of the assessor. Baker LJ deals with it in this way:
“108. Turning to ground 2, I accept the appellant’s argument, supported by Mind, that regulation 5 imposes a mandatory obligation to ensure that the assessment is carried out by someone with the skills, knowledge and competence to carry it out and that, where it considers the individual’s needs so require, the local authority must consult a person who has the necessary expertise in relation to the individual’s condition or other circumstances. In addition, when ensuring that the assessment is carried out appropriately, the local authority must, under regulation 3(2), have regard to the severity and overall extent of the individual’s needs. The provisions in the regulations are, as Ms Mellon demonstrated, supported by provisions in the Guidance at paragraphs 6.85 – 6.88. “It is essential that the assessment is carried out to the highest quality” (paragraph 6.85). The assessors must “have the skills and knowledge to carry out an assessment of needs that relates to a specific condition and circumstances” (paragraph 6.86). “When assessing particularly complex or multiple needs, an assessor may require the support of an expert to carry out the assessment, to ensure that the person’s needs are fully captured” (paragraph 6.87). Where the assessor does not have the necessary knowledge of a particular condition or circumstances, they must consult someone who has relevant expertise. This is to ensure that the assessor can ask the right questions relating to the condition and interpret those appropriately to identify underlying needs” (paragraph 6.88).
109. I recognise, of course, the very considerable skill and expertise which a trained social worker, such as the assessor in this case, brings to their work. But in the context of this case, given T’s complex diagnosis and needs, I agree that the local authority ought to have sought the advice of a psychiatrist or psychologist.”
54. Baker LJ makes it plain that the decision is fact specific. I do not read that as judicial authority or even guidance for the proposition that in a complex case in the Care Act arena capacity assessments must be undertaken by psychiatrists or psychologists. Nor am I prepared to read over such a proposition for assessments within the Court of Protection. There will, undoubtedly be cases where such expertise is essential or desirable, but each case will have to be looked at on its own facts. To the extent therefore that Ms Rickard submits that, either directly or by implication, TDB impels me to direct further assessments in this case, I reject her argument. It is noteworthy, in fact, that the two proposed experts put forward by the Official Solicitor are independent social workers rather than medical professionals (albeit one has a background in psychology) which, to some extent, contradicts her own case.
55. On the specific facts of CD’s case, the diagnostic element is not in any way in doubt. The functional element is key, particularly when she is distressed or anxious. A suitably experienced social worker is perfectly well equipped, in my judgment, to undertake assessments of capacity in this case.
Having expressed a concern as to the continuing impact of proceedings upon CD (notwithstanding her expressed wish for them to continue), HHJ Rogers turned finally to the Care Act 2014 in the following terms:
59. Finally, I turn to the relevance of the Care Act. The local authority recognises its provisions are engaged as CD is obviously a vulnerable person with needs. Its role is very important in my judgment. The guidance in TDB in this arena is in play. The cessation of these proceedings will not leave CD without support or in a vacuum. The local authority’s duties are ongoing and, it might be thought, are a more appropriate method of providing long-term support.
60. I share the Official Solicitor’s disquiet in respect of the phrase that if CD continues to decline support “her case will be closed to social care” (F79 and C200) I hope and indeed believe that that is effectively administrative jargon but, in my judgment, it is language to be avoided. The local authority’s responsibilities cannot be curtailed although I recognise that providing support to an unwilling recipient is fraught with difficulty and what is ultimately achievable in the real world may be limited. I am reassured by Mr Johnson’s acknowledgment of the local authority’s role and its willingness to persevere and in the last resort to bring the matter back to Court if necessary.
61. The interplay between this jurisdiction and the Care Act should not be underestimated. Just after I reserved judgment, the decision of His Honour Judge Burrows in PK & MK (Article 8 Protections) [2026] EWCOP 52 (T2) was published. I did not invite further submissions from counsel as this is not a binding authority or guidance and the facts are materially different, arising out of a deprivation of liberty. I do not therefore rely upon it in coming to my conclusions in this case. However, it makes interesting reading and, if I may so, is a cogent and thoughtful discussion of the sort of issues which arise when a case finishes in the Court of Protection but a local authority has ongoing responsibilities under the Care Act. Judge Burrows, rightly in my judgment, points to the need for the transition to be smooth and for adequate safeguards to be identified and put in place. I respectfully agree with that and have satisfied myself that it is so for CD.
HHJ Rogers therefore refused to make the:
62. […] case management applications for expert evidence or for further other evidence, I refuse the request to adjourn the proceedings for further investigation or argument, I endorse the local authority’s Post Clearance Plan, I declare it to be in CD’s best interests to receive the support in the Plan, I note the local authority’s ongoing responsibilities under the Care Act and I find that all live issues in this set of proceedings have been resolved. Accordingly, I am satisfied that these proceedings must be concluded.
Comment
That hoarding cases are complex is trite; this judgment reinforces some of the reasons why they are so. It also reinforces the need to keep clearly under review what, exactly, the Court of Protection can do at any given moment in time. The judgment is also of interest as part of what may in due course come to be seen as the second coming of the Care Act 2014, a piece of legislation which (in public profile) has been hugely overshadowed by the MCA 2005 and, specifically, DoLS / community deprivation of liberty since (in close succession) Cheshire West was decided and the Care Act came into force. Now that the Court of Protection will being acting far less often as a Care Act tribunal, it is all the more important that there is proper understanding of the skills and functions of those acting under the Care Act 2014.
